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The TURBO CADS exercises, which started in 1994, began
DoD' s efforts to develop an overseas commercial
containerized ammunition distribution system (CADS) . From
1994 through 1997, these exercises developed the military's
CADS but were only partially successful in using commercial
ocean carriers for overseas shipment of containerized
ammunition
.
This thesis examines how DoD has attempted to use the
commercial transportation system to move containerized
ammunition overseas. It identifies problems encountered
during the TURBO CADS exercises, examines commercial
business practices and regulations that cause difficulties,
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Commercial shipping, whether by rail, truck or ship,
can be broadly classified into two categories - breakbulk
and container. Breakbulk items are shipped loose or
stacked within a truck, ship or rail car, while container
cargo is shipped after being loaded into containers.
The most common shipping containers are eight feet
wide by eight feet high, with lengths of 20 and 40 feet.
Due to the reductions in handling time, damage, and theft,
commercial shipping companies have found containerized
shipping to be more efficient and cheaper than breakbulk.
With the exception of grains, oil, coal, gas, and other
large items, the commercial transportation industry has
moved almost completely from breakbulk to containerized
shipping. [Ref. 1, p. 33]
The use of containers has completely changed the
transportation industry in the last 40 years, supporting
the development of intermodal transportation.
Intermodal transportation is the concept of
transporting passengers and freight in such a way
that all the parts of the transportation process
are efficiently connected and coordinated,
offering flexibility. [Ref. 1, p.l]
Containerized intermodal shipments are common today.
The transportation industry now uses truck vans, rail
flatcars, and container ships to move freight from truck to
rail to ship, allowing efficient and seamless movement
between transportation modes. The cost savings of
containerized transportation has also interested the
Department of Defense (DoD) . [Ref. 1, p. 23]
The U.S. military is faced with tight budgets in the
foreseeable future. At the same time, U.S. forces must be
ready to deploy on short notice, to hostile environments,
for an unknown duration. This pressure is causing DoD
leaders to review military spending, looking for ways to
reduce cost without reducing capabilities.
According to the Mobility Requirements Study of 1992,
one method to reduce costs is to outsource military jobs to
commercial counterparts. To eliminate costly duplication
of commercial and DoD infrastructure, the military has been
considering outsourcing overseas containerized ammunition
transportation requirements to commercial ocean carriers.
[Ref. 2]
In November of 1992, the United States Commander-in-
Chief, Pacific (USCINCPAC) established a U.S. Pacific
(PACOM) munitions containerization working group. This
group determined that the current munitions delivery system
relied too much on the breakbulk movement of ammunition.
Using the group's recommendations, DoD decided to
develop the capacity to transport containerized ammunition.
The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) took
the lead on developing and funding joint exercises to
develop a containerized ammunition transportation system.
USTRANSCOM proposed a 5-year, TURBO (header for all
USTRANSCOM exercises) CADS (Containerized Ammunition
Distribution System) exercise program. TURBO CADS
exercises would stress the use of containerized ammunition
transportation from the ammunition depots to overseas
destinations. [Ref. 4]
Most ammunition destined for overseas locations is
currently shipped from the various ammunition depots to one
of three military ammunition ports: Naval Weapons Station
Concord, CA., Port Hadlock, WA., and Military Ocean
Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) , NC . From there it is
transported by DoD-owned ships to various overseas supply
bases. [Ref. 3]
TURBO CADS ' 94 was the first time the military
attempted to move containerized ammunition from the depots
to overseas military ports using DoD ships. The purpose of
this exercise was to train then test DoD depots and ports
in handling containerized ammunition. Overall, this
exercise was successful. With DoD now able to handle
containerized ammunition, TURBO CADS '95 attempted using
commercial transportation companies to move containerized
ammunition from depots through military and civilian U.S.
ports to military and civilian overseas ports within the
Pacific. This exercise was not successful as overseas and
U.S. commercial ports could not be used. TURBO CADS '96
was cancelled, and TURBO CADS ' 97 and ' 98 used government
ships to move containerized ammunition through military
ports. The viability of using commercial ocean
liners/carriers for peacetime movement of containerized
ammunition is in doubt. [Ref. 4,5,6,7]
Commercial truck and train carriers are used for
ammunition transportation within the continental U.S.
(CONUS). However, commercial overseas movement of
containerized ammunition is problematic. [Ref. 4,5,6,7]
Five problem areas have been identified.
1.
Regulations Governing the Movement of Ammunition
Two regulations governing ammunition are the U.S. Code
of Federal Regulations, (CFR) section 49, parts 171 to 177,
which list transportation regulations, and DoD Instruction
5100. 76M, which gives security requirements for ammunition.
For example, the CFR requires explosives to be segregated
from other flammable shipboard cargo, while DoD 5100. 76M
requires pierside security inspections of ammunition
containers . These requirements limit shipboard cargo
storage options and require more manpower. This adds
expense and time to ammunition shipments. Local commercial
port regulations also limit the quantity of ammunition
allowed within the port at any one time. This protects
nearby populations from accidental ammunition explosions,
but make ammunition movement through commercial ports very
expensive and time consuming.
2 . Waivers
Waivers are issued by regulating agencies to allow
relaxation of specified parts of ammunition regulations
such as those listed above. For example, a port regulation
limiting the amount of ammunition within a port may be
waived during a national emergency, but during peacetime, a
new waiver must be obtained for each ammunition shipment.
This adds expense and time to ammunition shipments.
3 . Permits
Coast Guard permits must be issued allowing ammunition
into a commercial U.S. port. These permits normally are
issued within one day of application, but have to be
obtained for each ammunition shipment. This also adds
expense and time to ammunition shipments.
4 . Shipping Route Profitability
Commercial shippers position their ships on routes
which maximize profits. They are very reluctant to move a
ship from a normally scheduled profitable route to pick up
ammunition from a military port that is less commercially
viable
.
5 . Political Considerations
Moving ammunition through any port tends to alarm
people who live nearby. This can cause political pressure
to disallow ammunition shipments through the port. For
example, just prior to Turbo Cads '95, the Pusan District
Maritime Port Authority refused to allow ammunition through
the commercial port of Pusan. They cited the local
population' s increasing concerns with the transportation
infrastructure after the collapse of a local bridge. [Ref.
5, p. 37]
These problems notwithstanding, DoD is focused on
outsourcing many of its transportation functions. [Ref. 8,
p.i] This is shown in the Focused Logistics portion of
Joint Vision 2010, where the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated
that
outsourcing, privatization and competition offer
the prospective of lowering costs and improving
performance across a wide range of activities.
[Ref 8, p. 36]
B . OBJECTIVES
The subject of this thesis is commercial
transportation of military ammunition. The goal is to
examine how DoD has attempted to use the commercial
transportation system to move containerized ammunition
overseas, identify problems encountered, and make
recommendations for how to better utilize the
commercial system. The primary objective is to
examine the viability of using commercial




How can commercial ocean carriers be used by DoD
to carry containerized ammunition during peacetime
operations?
2 . Secondary Questions
What are the commercial options for moving
containerized ammunition through military and civilian
ports?
What are the implications of DoD' s policy of
moving ammunition in 20 foot containers while the
commercial industry predominantly uses 40 foot
containers?
What are the compliance, waiver and cargo
segregation requirements for DoD and commercial
shippers under 49 CFR 171-177?
What are the Net Explosive Weight
requirements for ports?
What are DoD security and policy
requirements for moving ammunition through commercial
ports?
What are the political considerations
associated with shipping containerized ammunition
through commercial ports?
Do the problems and regulations make
ammunition movement so difficult and unique that it
should be done by government vessels?
8
What caused TURBO CADS '95 Plan A to fail?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, METHODOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis will examine DoD' s previous attempts
at using commercial ocean carriers for shipping
containerized ammunition from U.S. military and
commercial ports. The study will explore the
viability of commercial overseas movement of
ammunition. More specifically, the thesis will: (1)
review TURBO CADS x 94-'97; (2) examine DoD, federal
and local regulations regarding the movement of
ammunition; (3) look at political considerations
associated with moving ammunition through commercial
ports; and (4) discuss business considerations
involving ammunition transportation. The thesis will
then summarize the issues, draw conclusions and make
recommendations on commercial overseas transportation
options
.
The scope of this thesis will be limited to
examining containerized ammunition transportation
through the ports of Oakland, CA., Concord, CA., and
Port Hadlock, WA. to overseas military ports.
9
Problems dealing with moving ammunition through the
foreign commercial ports of Pusan and Chinhae,
Republic of Korea (ROK) will also be discussed.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter described how and why DoD has moved
towards using commercial carriers to move
containerized ammunition overseas. It provided
background information on containerized shipping,
ammunition movement, TURBO CADS exercises, and DoD'
s
reasons for outsourcing transportation functions. It
also identified the major problems involved in
shipping containerized ammunition through U.S. ports
to overseas locations.
Chapter II will provide specific information
about the TURBO CADS exercises including results and
recommendations from past exercise reports. Chapter
III will examine federal, DoD, Coast Guard, and local
regulations concerning ammunition movements through
U.S. commercial ports. Chapter IV will look at
business concerns including movement options,
container sizes, routes, and political considerations.
10




II. TURBO CADS EXERCISES
A. AMMUNITION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
Military ammunition is defined as "ammunition of all
types, bombs, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators,
pyrotechnics, missiles, rockets, propellants, and other
associated items." [Ref. 10, p.A6] Military forces rely
on the ammunition distribution system for the production
and transportation of ammunition to their locations.
The military' s ammunition distribution system consists
of the Army Material Command, Industrial Operations Command
(IOC), each Service, munitions plants, depots, and
USTRANSCOM and its component commands - Military
Transportation Management Command (MTMC) , Military Sealift
Command (MSC) , and Air Mobility Command (AMC)
.
The IOC, under the direction of the Army Material
Command, is responsible for managing ammunition for all
U.S. military services and is designated the Single Manager
for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) . The SMCA is
responsible for ammunition procurement, running ammunition
depots, life cycle management, and disposal. Within the
IOC, ammunition is broken down into different groups with
13
each group controlled by an item manager. All ammunition
is tracked throughout its lifetime with the use of a
Department of Defense Identification Code (DODIC) . [Ref
.
11, p. 13]
USTRANSCOM is responsible for providing air, land, and
ocean transportation to DoD during peace and war. Under
USTRANSCOM, AMC handles air transportation, MSC is
responsible for ocean transportation, and MTMC manages land
transportation and port management. [Ref. 12, p. 4]
Since the end of the Cold War, DoD has been shifting
from large stockpiles of conventional ammunition to
smaller, safer, and higher quality reserves. Because the
major use of ammunition in peacetime is for training,
ammunition depots within the continental U.S. were divided
into east, west, and central regions. Additionally, they
are now being divided into three tiers with at least one
depot from each tier per region: (1) Tier I stores training
ammunition and the first 30 days of war reserve ammunition;
(2) Tier II stores war reserve ammunition for use after the
first 30 day of conflict; and (3) Tier III is used as
caretaker facilities for storing ammunition in excess of
DoD's needs. This new arrangement should be completed by
2001. [Ref. 9]
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From the ammunition depots, ammunition is shipped by
MTMC, under the direction of IOC, via truck or train to
either continental U.S. (CONUS) destinations or ammunition
ports. From the ammunition ports, ammunition travels via











Figure 1 . Ammunition Distribution
IOC also ships ammunition to CONUS Naval weapons
storage facilities (ammunition magazines). The Navy then
resupplies its ships under way, using specialized at sea
replenishment ships. Naval ammunition will not be
15
discussed in the remainder of this thesis since it isn't
reliant on ammunition distribution outside of the
continental United States. Additionally, Navy at sea
replenishment operations are not adaptable to containerized
ammunition movement. [Ref. 11, p. 25]
B. DEVELOPMENT OF TURBO CADS EXERCISES
As mentioned in Chapter I, DoD had begun thinking
about the time and cost efficiencies gained through the use
of containerization . This was reinforced by the completion
of the Team Spirit 1993 Intermodal Initiative. This
exercise successfully used containers to transport military
equipment from specific military units. Testing the
containerization of ammunition shipments was a logical
extension to this policy. [Ref. 4, p. 7]
The United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific
(USCINCPAC) felt that the best approach was to develop a
series of joint service, USTRANSCOM-supported containerized
ammunition transportation exercises. In November 1993,
USCINCPAC, utilizing the Army's Containerized Ammunition
Distribution Executive Group, established a working group
to develop exercise details. The group's purpose was to
16
develop a plan that would lead to institutionalizing
containerized ammunition shipments in the Pacific. The
plan proposed was a 5-year exercise program stressing a
containerized ammunition distribution system (CADS) from
ammunition depots to destinations. [Ref. 4, p. 8]
During this time, USTRANSCOM noted that ammunition
delivery to overseas locations depended almost solely on
breakbulk equipment. However, breakbulk shipping continues
to decline as the commercial world moves toward the use of
containerships . Additionally, government-owned breakbulk
ships are reaching the end of their useful life. Realizing
DoD' s future dependence upon commercial shipping for
ammunition transportation, and armed with the success of
the Team Spirit unit containerization exercise, USTRANSCOM
agreed to assume sponsorship for development and control of
the TURBO CADS exercises. [Ref. 4, p. 7, 8]
C. TURBO CADS '94
1 . Concept of Operations
The first TURBO CADS (TC) exercise was conducted from
August 1 to November 27, 1994. Its purpose was to train
facilities and test CADS capabilities from CONUS ammunition
17
depots and Alaska to destinations in the Pacific. The
secondary purpose was to satisfy yearly ammunition
transportation requirements for U.S. forces in the Pacific
region. [Ref. 13]
A total of 1387 twenty foot containers or twenty foot
equivalent units (TEU) of ammunition were moved from six
CONUS depots and two forts in Alaska to three seaports of
embarkation (SPOE) . The depots were: Crane Army Activity,
Indiana; Hawthorne Army Ammunition Plant, Nevada;
McAllister Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma; Seneca Army
Ammunition Depot, New York; and Sierra Army Depot,
California. The Alaska forts were Fort Wainwright and
Richardson. The SPOEs were Naval Weapons Station (NWS)
Concord, CA; Indian Head (Port Hadlock) , WA; and Valdez,
AK.
From the SPOEs, the ammunition traveled by ship to
Apra Harbor, Guam; Tengan, Okinawa; Chinhae, ROK; and Hiro,
Japan. From these seaports of debarkation (SPOD) the
munitions were moved to their final destinations: Anderson
AFB, Guam; Kadena AFB, Okinawa; Suwon, Osan, Chong-ju, and
Kunson ASB, ROK. Retrograde (outdated, defective or no
longer needed) ammunition was also shipped breakbulk to
CONUS from Guam, ROK, and Okinawa.
18
CONUS transportation from the depots to the SPOE was
via commercial rail and truck. From the SPOE, sealift was
provided by the SS Gem State and the MV Green Wave. The SS
Gem State is a self loading and unloading (self-sustaining)
680 container capacity cargo ship from the Ready Reserve
Fleet (RRF) ; the MV Green Wave is an MSC-chartered, self-
sustaining, breakbulk/cargo container ship. From the SPOD,
the containers traveled via rail and truck to military
facilities
.
2 . TURBO CADS ' 94 Objectives
The specific objectives of TC94 as put forth by
USTRANSCOM are listed below:
1. Use off-the-shelf commercial and DoD containers.
2. Evaluate on-hand container handling equipment
(CHE), and identify shortfalls.
3. Identify transportation system shortfalls that




Show the usefulness and ease of blocking and
bracing improvements compared to breakbulk.
5. Observe inland railroad movement of containerized
munitions in the ROK.
6. Observe and evaluate containerized munitions
transfer, stuffing, and unstuffing operations.
7. Assist in developing a CADS doctrine.
19
Exercise NWS Concord's container throughput
capability. [Ref. 4, p. 3]
3 . TURBO CADS ' 94 Problems
There was one major problem that occurred during this
exercise. This was the lack of container handling
equipment (CHE) . Since military depots and bases had been
moving ammunition breakbulk, they lacked container handling
experience as well as equipment capable of moving
containers
.
4 . TURBO CADS ' 94 Conclusions
Overall, the exercise was deemed successful. Notable
conclusions are listed below:
1. Containerized ammunition transfer, stuffing and
unstuffing operations were observed and doctrine
was developed. DoD was capable of transporting





Operations were slowed by severe shortages of
container handling equipment (CHE) from origin to
destination. CHE was borrowed from other commands
or leased to solve the shortages.
3. Facilities lacked experience handling
containerized munitions. This required sending a
team of experts to train personnel just prior to
the exercise. Ammunition depots were taught how
to stuff containers correctly using proper
blocking and bracing techniques.
20
4.
Inland railroad movement of containerized
munitions was successful within the U.S. and the
ROK. NWS Concord successfully handled all
container operations.
5. Communication channels between DoD and commercial
intermodal companies needed improvement. [Ref. 4]
These conclusions were used to design the next TURBO
CADS exercise. Additionally, with the concept of
containerized ammunition proven and most of TC94's
objectives met, the next step would involve commercial
industry further.
D. TURBO CADS '95
1 . Concept of Operations
TURBO CADS ' 95 was conducted from June 1st to August
31, 1995 in the Pacific area of operations. The primary
purpose was to ship ammunition via commercial
transportation, from depots, through civilian and military
ports, to destinations in the Far East. The secondary
purpose was to satisfy yearly ammunition transportation
requirements for U.S. forces in the Pacific region. [Ref.
13] Ammunition would be shipped via rail and truck from
twelve CONUS depots to SPOEs at NWS Concord, Oakland, CA.
and Tacoma, WA. Movement from depot to SPOE was to
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maximize the use of rail and be augmented by truck. SPODs
would be Pusan, ROK; Hiro, Japan; Okinawa, and Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii. [Ref. 14]
2 . TURBO CADS ' 95 Objectives
The specific objectives of TC95 as put forth by
USTRANSCOM are listed below:
1. To achieve commercial door-to-door munitions
movement utilizing a contract with a commercial
carrier
.
2. To test Pacific military units' CADS capabilities.
3. To test modern In-Transit-Visibility (ITV)
technology systems in tracking containers. This
involves the use of radio freguency (RF) tags that
are attached to shipping containers. When queried
by a source, such as a satellite, the tags respond
much like an airplane transponder does to a radar
signal. In this way, the location of the
containers can be tracked.
4
.
To improve DoD and commercial industry
partnership. [Ref. 5, p. 2]
To achieve these objectives, the exercise was divided
into two plans. Plan A was to use commercial liners to
move 236 TEUs through the commercial ports of Tacoma and
Oakland to Pusan, ROK. This commercial contract was
restricted to U.S. ocean liner companies. Plan B was to
use commercial carriers to move 1536 TEUs through NWS
22
Concord to military ports in Hawaii, Okinawa, Japan and the
ROK. This contract was open to all carriers. [Ref. 14]
3 . TURBO CADS ' 95 Problems
Plan A was unsuccessful. It was cancelled because the
ROK disapproved the use of Pusan, a large commercial port,
after gas explosions in Taegu, ROK and the earthguake in
Kobe, Japan. [Ref. 5, p. 5] Plan A's container load was
then shifted to Plan B, increasing that load to 1772 TEUs.
Plan B was partially successful. With Pusan now
closed, munitions into Korea had to go through Chinhae,
ROK. Due to a modernization program, the port was not
available at all times. Because of this and the increased
number of TEUs, no commercial carrier would agree to meet
the required delivery dates. This problem was solved when
MSC chartered the MV Corpus Christi to immediately move 594
TEUs from Concord to Chinhae, ROK.
Although the MV Corpus Christi solved the immediate
problem, there were still 1178 TEUs waiting in Concord.
This problem was solved by Crowley Maritime Services, Inc.
The company proposed to transport the remaining ammunition
using an ocean-going tug and self-unloading barge.
Although the speed was only eight knots, a workable
23
schedule was devised. [Ref. 14] This proved to be an
excellent solution, as the Crowley tug and barge performed
all scheduled portcalls including unloading and loading of
munitions. Additionally, the tug and barge returned 368
TEUs of retrograde to NWS Concord. [Ref. 5, p. 8]
4 . Conclusions
Overall, the exercise was a success; however, there
were many conclusions. The major ones are listed below.
1. Commercial door-to-door service is not possible
without risk assessments and waivers for ports
and intermodal transfer facilities. DoD and
commercial companies must comply with the U.S.
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) , section 49,
parts 171-177 when transporting explosives.
Current waiver authority is vested with MTMC
.
USTRANSCOM should have waiver authority.
2. The commercial intermodal system is not effective
at using West Coast DoD munitions ports. This is
due to low productivity and because commercial
carriers are unable to support stops there with
normal -liner service. Port Hadlock, WA. should
be upgraded to support containerized operations
and DoD should continue attempting munitions
movement through commercial ports.
3. The commercial industry response was below
expectations. Ocean carriers' proposals didn't
meet required delivery dates for Plan B; there
was slow placement of railcars at depots; and the
lack of truck backloads caused slow motor carrier
support until DoD agreed to pay deadhead (empty
return trip) mileage. To achieve better
economies of scale, all requirements for a
movement should be offered in a single contract,
24
with truck, rail, and ocean carriers involved in
exercise planning meetings.
4. ITV through radio frequency (RF) tags required
host nation approval. Japan initially
disapproved frequencies; at that time, there were
no international standards or authority for RF
tags. DoD needed to push for RF standards, and
ensure that DoD RF tags are acceptable in
countries where cargo is shipped. It should be
noted that since then, international RF
standards have been developed which DoD now
follows
.
5. The ocean going tug and barge was a surprising
success, providing a viable strategic capability
for sustainment and resupply. They are also an
excellent intra-theater platform and USTRANSCOM
should consider this capability in future OPLANs
.
[Ref. 5, 14]
Integrating DoD's ammunition transportation system
with existing commercial intermodal services was proving to
be very challenging. However, the overall results were
positive and the recommendation was made to continue.
E. TURBO CADS '96
TC96 was cancelled. Originally, it was to apply the
lessons learned and recommendations of TC95 in the U.S.
Central Command's (CENTCOM) area of operations. However,
the Middle East proved to be an exceptionally difficult,
politically sensitive and expensive area for commercial
25
ammunition shipments. Reasons given for cancellation
included difficulties in getting port waivers and permits,
host country permissions as well as funding for commercial
liners. Turbo Cads '97 was then scheduled for the
CENTCOM's area of operations. [Ref. 15]
F. TURBO CADS '97
1 . Concept of Operations
Turbo Cads '97 was conducted from 16 July to 7
November 1997 in support of United States Commander-in-
Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) . The exercise
requirements were to transport 777 TEUs of ammunition via
rail and truck from various depots to the SPOE at Military
Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU) , N.C. From MOTSU, the
munitions would be shipped to Kuwait and Ad Dammam, Saudi
Arabia. The Ad Dammam munitions would then be line-hauled
by military units to a munitions storage area near Prince
Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Retrograde ammunition would
be returned for delivery to NWS Concord (922 TEUs) . The
secondary purpose was to satisfy yearly ammunition
transportation requirements for U.S. forces in the Middle
East region. [Ref. 13]
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2 . TURBO CADS ' 97 Objectives
The primary objectives were similar to TC96 with one
major exception - there would be no commercial ocean liners
used. Instead, the ammunition would travel on the SS Cape
Farewell, a RRF lighter aboard ship (LASH) vessel. A LASH
vessel carries small barges filled with cargo. This vessel
had been modified to allow stacked containers vice
breakbulk cargo in her LASH barges. The barges would be
dropped off at the port entrance in Kuwait and Ad Dammam.
Tugs would then move the barges to the pier and return
retrograde loaded barges to Cape Farewell.
The decision to use the SS Cape Farewell instead of
commercial liners was due to the uncertainty in obtaining
host nation permission for the exercise. This uncertainty
made it exceptionally difficult to contract out the
service. Carriers would not agree to a service and price
without dates. Additionally, USTRANSCOM was intrigued by
Crowley's ocean barge success in TC95 and wanted to test




TURBO CADS ' 97 Problems
The only significant problem with this exercise was in
obtaining host nation approval. One of the host nations
linked approval of TC97 to other unrelated issues. This
resulted in an approval delay and required direct
intervention by CENTCOM. Once approval was granted, there
were no other significant problems.
4 . Conclusions
This exercise successfully showed the feasibility of
using LASH ships for containerized ammunition
transportation.
G. SUMMARY
The TURBO CADS exercises have partially proven the
concept of commercial containerized ammunition shipments.
TC94, TC95, and TC97 showed that the military ships and
facilities could handle containerized ammunition. TC95
also showed that commercial ocean transportation of
containerized ammunition was possible although not through
commercial ports. Within CONUS, ammunition can be moved
commercially via rail or truck with few problems. However,
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overseas commercial shipments are problematic. Of the
three overseas commercial methods attempted, only one was
successful. These methods and their results are as
follows
:
1. Ocean going tug and self sustaining barge using
military ports. This was used successfully by
Crowley American Transport to move containerized
ammunition from NWS Concord to South Korea during
TC95. It is the only entirely commercial method
that was successful. Transport time using this
option can be an issue and will be explored in
Chapter IV.
2. Commercial liner service using commercial ports.
This was unsuccessfully attempted in TC95. The
main problems appeared to be obtaining required
U.S. /host nation port waivers and permits,
scheduling, and cost problems. These problems
will be explored further in Chapters III and IV.
3. Commercial liner service using military ports.
This method was attempted during TC95. There
were no contracts awarded due to excessive cost
and schedule problems. These problems will be
explored in Chapters III and IV.
It is important to note the quantities of ammunition
shipped during the exercises - 1387 TEUs in TC94, 1772 TEUs
in TC95 and 777 TEUs in TC97 . This is not a large quantity
when compared with the large capacity (4000 TUEs and
higher) of modern container ships or the 787,884 short tons
(equivalent to approximately 40,000 TEUs) shipped during
the Gulf War with Iraq. [Ref. 1, p. 24], [Ref. 5, p. 27],
[Ref. 16, Appendix 10]
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The TURBO CADS exercise program has been an effective
way of exploring and integrating commercial transportation
practices into the Defense Transportation System but is not
without its problems.
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III. SEAPORT AMMUNITION TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of Chapter III is to examine the various
regulations controlling the movement of containerized
ammunition through the commercial ports of Oakland, CA. and
Pusan, ROK, and the military ports at Naval Weapons Station
Concord, CA., Port Hadlock, WA., and Chinhae, ROK.
Additionally, specific regulations will be identified that
cause transportation of containerized ammunition through
commercial ports to be problematic. Regulations governing
movement of containerized ammunition through military ports
are also covered since using commercial carriers through
military ports is also an option.
Key points will be discussed and important details
given so that the reader gains an understanding of the
regulatory difficulties associated with moving
containerized ammunition through seaports. To accomplish
this, applicable portions of the following will be
discussed:
Title 49 and Title 33, U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations;
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2. DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD Ammunition and Explosive Safety
Standards;
3. DoD 5100. 76M, Physical Security of Sensitive
Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives;
4. Department of Defense Regulation 4500.9-R-l,
Management and Control of the DOD Intermodal Container
System;
5. Department of Defense Regulation 4500. 9-R, Cargo
Movement;
6. Single Ammunition Logistics System Agreement - Korea
(SALS-K)
;
7. Port of Oakland, Tariff No. 2A, Hazardous Materials
Rules and Regulations.
Items 1 and 7 deal with movement of explosives through
U.S. commercial and military ports, items 2 through 5 are
additional DoD requirements for U.S. military ammunition,
and item 6 defines how ammunition for U.S. forces will be
brought into the ROK.
B. U.S. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
1 . Background
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) is a
codification of rules published in the Federal Register by
executive departments and agencies of the federal
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government. For the purpose of containerized ammunition
movement through commercial and military ports, the
relevant portions are Transportation (Title 49) and
Navigation and Navigable Waters (Title 33). These portions
are under the cognizance of the Department of
Transportation and enforced by the U.S. Coast Guard. [Ref.
17, Title 49, Part 176.4]
2. Title 49, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations
a . Definitions
Title 4 9 covers the movement of hazardous
materials by seagoing vessels. It applies to all U.S.
commercial and military ammunition shipments. Under the
Code of Federal Regulations, military ammunition is a Class
1 hazardous material. A Class 1 hazardous material is an
explosive and is defined as:
a device which is designed to function by an
explosion or which, by chemical reaction within
itself, is able to function in a similar manner
even if not designed to function by explosion.
[Ref. 17, Title 49, Part 173.50]
Class 1 materials (explosives) are divided, from highest to
lowest volatility, into six divisions which are defined
below:
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1. Division 1.1 is the most violent, and covers explosives
where the entire explosive material reacts
instantaneously. This is called a mass explosion
hazard.
2. Division 1.2 consists of explosives that have a
projectile hazard but not a mass explosion hazard.
3. Division 1.3 refers to explosives that have a fire
hazard and either a small blast or projectile hazard.
4. Division 1.4 specifies explosives with a small
explosion hazard that would be largely confined to the
package.
5. Division 1.5 consists of insensitive explosives. They
can have a mass explosion hazard, but are very
insensitive to both shock and fire.
6. Division 1.6 includes extremely insensitive explosives
with no mass explosion hazard. [Ref. 17, Title 49,
Part 173.50]
The six Class I material divisions are further
classified by using 13 compatibility group letters.
Compatibility group letters identify specific hazards. For
example, compatibility group "H" is an article containing
both an explosive substance and white phosphorus, while
compatibility group "J" is an article which contains an
explosive substance and a flammable liquid or gel. [Ref.
17, Title 49, Part 173.52]
These divisions and compatibility group letters
are used by the Department of Transportation, Department of
Defense and Port Authorities for prescribing safety
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equipment, shipping papers, permits, labeling, stowage,
material segregation, supervisory requirements, and waivers
for the transportation of explosives. [Ref 17, Title 49,
Part 173.50]
b. Shipping Papers, Permits, and Safety
Equipment
Prior to accepting Class I material for
transport, commercial carriers are responsible for ensuring
the material is identified on a dangerous cargo manifest.
This manifest identifies the material being shipped and
lists its hazard classification. Additionally, the carrier
must obtain a permit from the U.S. Coast Guard for handling
dangerous cargo. This permit certifies that the pier and
its equipment are safe for explosives and designates it as
an explosive handling facility. Permit requirements
include keeping firefighting equipment nearby, no open
ignition sources, warning sirens, security guards for
preventing unlawful entrance and theft, handling equipment
certification, satisfactory lighting, and free space for
emergency access. [Ref. 17, Title 33, Parts 126.13-126.37]
The CFR requirements for explosive handling
certification ensure safe conditions exist for handling
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explosives. However, these requirements also add expense
to ammunition shipments. For example, if a pier is not
already certified, equipment upgrades, configuration
changes and security guards will be required. For piers
already certified, there will be expenses for equipment
maintenance, inspections, and security guards.
c. Labeling, Segregation, and Stowage
Once a permit is obtained for transporting and
loading explosives, specific labeling and stowage
requirements must be met.
All explosives are required to have an
appropriate label on the outside container corresponding to
the division (from 1.1 to 1.6) and the compatibility group
letter. This label informs all personnel of the dangers
associated with the material and ensures proper
identification. Figure 2 shows a sample of these labels.
Note that for Class 1.1-1.3, the division number and
compatibility group letter replace the double asterisks,
while for 1.4-1.6 the compatibility group letter replaces
the single asterisk. [Ref. 17, Title 49, Parts 172.411,
172.312, and 173.52]
36
Figure 2 . Class 1 Explosive Labels
Segregation of Class 1 materials from other
hazardous materials aboard ships is required to prevent
accidental ignition. Materials such as oxidizing
substances, corrosives, flammable gases, flammable liquids,
flammable solids, poisons, organic peroxides, and
radioactive materials must be separated from explosives.
However, the separation varies among the divisions from
simply "away from," defined as at least three meters, to
separation by compartment or hold. For example, a Class
1.1 explosive must be separated by an intervening
compartment or hold from flammable solids while a Class 1.2
explosive must simply be in a different compartment or
hold. [Ref. 17, Title 49, Table 176.83]
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Ship compartments where Class I materials are
stowed must be clean, safe from any sources of fire or
ignition, be dry and in a cool part of the ship, have no
exposed electrical equipment, and have all cable joint
connections enclosed in metal-clad junction boxes. When
stowed on deck, containers must be stowed as close to the
centerline of the vessel as possible. Any explosives that
are sensitive to radar or radio signals must be stowed at a
safe distance from all transmitting antennas. This
distance is determined by the specific characteristics of
the explosives and the signal power of the antenna. [Ref.
17, Title 49, Parts 176.112-176.138]
Segregation of explosive material aboard ship
helps prevent accidental explosions. However, this
segregation requires additional time for load planning and
limits the shipboard locations available for ammunition,




During the loading or unloading of Class I
materials, a responsible person with complete knowledge of
appropriate regulations must be in attendance. This is to
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ensure that all personnel obey rules for handling
explosives. [Ref. 17, Title 49, Part 176.104]
e . Waivers
Specific regulations governing explosives for
commercial ports may be relaxed by the U.S. Coast Guard.
The granting of waivers is a subjective decision, and can
be done only when the Coast Guard finds that any of the
regulations governing explosives is
not necessary to the safety of security of the
port and vessels and waterfront facilities
therein, or that its application is not practical
because of local conditions or because the
materials or personnel required for compliance
are not available, or because the requirements of
the national defense justify a departure from
such provision, the Commandant of the Coast
Guard, the District Commander, or the Captain of
the Port (local Coast Guard Commander) may waive
compliance with such provision, to the extent and
under such requirements as they determine. [Ref.
17, Title 33, Part 126.11]
Waivers, when granted, are only for specific
regulations covering specific times and shipments. They
must be individually requested by the carrier.
Additionally, waivers take one person approximately one
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working day to obtain. This adds costs to ammunition
shipments. [Ref. 17, Title 33, Part 126.11, Ref. 18]
C. MILITARY REGULATIONS
1 . Introduction
Military ammunition transportation regulations
proscribe safety and security measures, and assign
responsibility for ammunition transportation to specific
DoD agencies. These regulations cover both commercial and
military carriers and are in addition to any local or
federal regulations. For example, DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD
Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards, defines net
explosive weights (NEW) and gives detailed procedures for
calculating the NEW allowed within a certain distance in
populated areas. DoD 5100. 76-M, Physical Security of
Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives,
lists very specific security requirements for their
transportation. Finally, Defense Transportation Regulation
4500. 9-R, Cargo Movement, assigns responsibilities and
procedures for moving DoD cargo using commercial or DoD
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carriers. Applicable portions of these and other
regulations are discussed below.
2. Net Explosive Weights (NEW) - DoD 6055.9-STD, DoD
Ammunition and Explosive Safety Standards
This standard is used to protect populations and
structures from accidental explosions by limiting the
amount or NEW of explosive material allowed within certain
areas. For example, the NEW allowed in downtown New York
would be much less than that allowed in a wilderness area.
The Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board
(DDESB) uses this standard to
provide safety surveys and evaluations of
ammunition and explosives facilities and
activities worldwide to determine compliance with
applicable safety standards and to detect
conditions endangering life or property inside or
outside DoD installation boundaries. [Ref. 19]
Specifically, DDESB uses the standards and guidelines in
DoD 6055.9-STD to establish specific NEWs for commercial
and military ports.
The NEW for a specific location is calculated using a
quantity distance (Q-D) table and the population of the
specific location. The Q-D is the quantity of an explosive
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that, if exploded, would cause a limited amount of damage
or loss of life outside that distance. There are different
Q-Ds for different classes of explosives. Given the
different classes being shipped, the Q-D is then overlaid
on a local population map to give the maximum NEW for a
location. [Ref. 20, p. 128-134]
The DDESB has the authority to waive NEW requirements
for up to five years. However, waivers are granted only
for "strategic and compelling needs" such as an attack on
South Korea by North Korea, and only pending correction of
the waived condition. [Ref. 20, p. 13]
3. Net Explosive Weights (NEW) of Ports
As described above, the NEW allowed varies from port
to port, is determined by the DDESB, and is a function of
the surrounding population. NEWs for all ports pertinent
to this thesis with the exception of Oakland are listed
below. The NEW for Oakland will be discussed later in this
Chapter
.
1. NWS Concord, CA. - 6,000,000-11,235,000 lbs. depending
upon the pier.
2. Port Hadlock, WA. - 2,250,000 lbs.
3. Chinhae, ROK - 3,000,000 lbs.
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4. Pusan, ROK - 1,500,000 lbs. [Ref. 21, Ref. 22]
The NEW allowed is a controlling factor in the
movement of containerized ammunition through ports. Recall
that 1772 TEUs of ammunition were shipped during TC95.
Since the weight of an ammunition container can exceed
20,000 lbs., a 1,500,000 lbs. NEW can be exceeded with as
few as 75 TEUs of ammunition (depending on the type)
.
4. DoD 5100. 76M, Physical Security of Sensitive
Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives
The purpose of DoD 5100. 76-M is to set standards and
criteria to protect against the loss or theft of AA&E
.
These procedures apply to DoD components and commercial
activities transporting AA&E. The sections that apply to
ports and ships will be discussed below.
AA&E are divided into risk categories based on their
relative "utility, attractiveness, and availability to
criminal elements." [Ref. 23, p.A-1] Specific
transportation security requirements are then defined for
each risk category. For ammunition, the risk categories
are defined below. [Ref. 23, p.A-1]
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1. Category I - This category consists of complete
explosive rounds for man-portable missiles and rockets.
Examples of some man-portable missiles and rockets
include Stinger, Javelin, light anti-tank weapon (LAW)
,
and tube launch optically guided weapon (TOW) missiles.
2. Category II - Includes hand or rifle grenades, mines
(anti-tank or anti-personnel), explosives used in
demolition operations (C-4), and warheads for missiles
an rockets under 100 pounds.
3. Category III - This category includes shells and
bullets .50 caliber and larger with an explosive filled
projectile, incendiary grenades, fuses, blasting caps,
and detonating cord.
4. Category IV - This category includes shells and bullets
with non-explosive warheads, illumination grenades,
riot control agents (tear gas) , and any other
ammunition not otherwise categorized. [Ref. 23, p.A-
2,3]
Most transportation security distinctions occur when
ammunition is transported via train or truck. For
shipboard movement, ammunition security measure
distinctions are made between Category I and Categories II-
IV. These requirements are listed below.
Category I shipments received or released from
commercial or military ports require satellite
monitoring (SM) and dual driver protective services
(DDPS) to the port of embarkation (POE) and from the
port of debarkation (POD) . SM is accomplished
through the use of transceivers mounted on containers
that are queried by satellite to determine location.
DDPS requires two personnel maintaining continuous
surveillance of the shipment.
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2. Category I shipments require that a continuous audit
trail from shipper to consignee be maintained.
3. Category I shipments require that each container be
checked, sealed and locked in the presence of two
responsible agents of the shipper prior to delivery
to the carrier. [Ref. 24]
All ammunition categories require the following.
1. Written receipt and release of the ammunition is
required from the ship's officer at the POE and the
POD.
2. Cargo must be in locked and sealed containers.
3. Containers must be stowed so doors are not accessible
to stevedores or ship's crew.
4
.
Locations of sensitive AA&E must be indicated on the
final stow plan for the ship.
5. Vessels moving sensitive AA&E must be U.S. Naval




The requirements of DoD 5100. 76-M increase the time
and man-hours needed to move ammunition through ports.
Additional inspections are required to ensure that all
containers are locked with seals intact and stowed so
container doors are inaccessible. These additional
procedures slow the loading of containers. This is
especially important in commercial ports since higher
pierside charges directly increase a ship's operating cost.
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5. Department of Defense Regulation 4500.9-R-l,
Management and Control of the DOD Intermodal
Container System
The purpose of this regulation is to provide policy
for the management and control of DoD owned, leased, or
commercially provided containers. The importance of this
regulation is the standard prescribed for ammunition
shipments. [Ref. 25, p. 1-1]
The regulation designates the 20-foot shipping
container as the DoD standard for shipping ammunition. The
purpose of this standard is to ensure that all DoD
components have material handling equipment for 20-foot
containers; however, it also excludes 40-foot containers
from use. The importance of this exclusion will be
discussed in Chapter IV. [Ref. 25, p. 1-2]
6. Department of Defense Regulation 4500. 9-R, Cargo
Movement
This regulation assigns responsibilities for
performing DoD traffic management functions. The
importance of the regulation to this thesis is that
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) has been
designated by DoD as the point of contact for all matters
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pertaining to the establishment, amendment, or
clarification of DoD ammunition transportation regulations.
Additionally, MTMC is responsible for issuing waivers for
DoD regulations and for coordinating any waivers with
outside agencies regarding ammunition transportation
issues. [Ref. 26, p. 204-1]
7 . Single Ammunition Logistics Support Agreement
(SALS-K)
The SALS-K, signed in 1974, is an agreement between
the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) defining how
ammunition is brought into the ROK. Under the terms of
this agreement, the ROK Army provides all port handling,
inland transportation, storage, security and disposal for
ammunition. Additionally, the ammunition pier at Chinhae
is the only pier in the ROK designated for ammunition
shipping operations. The U.S. acts primarily in a
managerial role, ensuring all ammunition shipments conforms
to U.S. safety and security regulations. This system
benefits the Koreans as the U.S procures their ammunition,
(and ammunition for U.S. forces), while the Koreans control
the entry and movement of ammunition within their country.
The U.S. benefits by having reduced ammunition material
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handling, transportation, and stowage costs. [Ref. 5,
p. 36], [Ref. 27]
Ammunition safety and security regulations conform to
those required by U.S. federal and DoD regulations with ROK
Army personnel providing dual driver protective services
when required. The one additional requirement is that a
ROK Army patrol boat be provided for seaside security
during ammunition movement. [Ref. 5, p. 36] [Ref. 27]
Moving containerized ammunition into the ROK through
any port other than Chinhae is extremely difficult under
this agreement. This was shown during TURBO CADS '95, when
the ROK, citing terms of the SALS-K agreement, refused to
grant permission to transport U.S. ammunition through the
commercial port of Pusan.
D. PORT OF OAKLAND REGULATIONS
1. Port of Oakland Tariff No. 2A
The Oakland Board of Port Commissioners has
established additional requirements before explosives are
allowed within the port area. These regulations primarily
deal with the quantity and time that explosive material is
allowed within the port. They are summarized below.
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1. A Port of Oakland HAZARDOUS MATERIALS HANDLING PERMIT
(HMHP) must first be issued by the Oakland Board of
Port Commissioners. This permit ensures Port
Authorities are aware of shipments, and applicants are
familiar with shipment requirements.
2. All explosives must be stowed or contained within
sealed hatches or shipping containers prior to
entering the port unless specific permission is
granted on the HMHP.
3. Class 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives are limited to a
total amount of 13.5 tons net explosive weight (NEW)
within the port at any one time. NEW is defined as
the total weight of the explosive material. For
example, the NEW of a bullet would be the weight of
the gunpowder, and wouldn't include the casing and
bullet weight.
4. Class 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosives can't remain on the
pier longer than two hours, must be loaded on the ship
just prior to departure and unloaded as early as
possible after docking.
5. Class 1.4 and 1.5 explosives are limited to a total of
100 tons NEW within the port at any one time.
6. Class 1.4 and 1.5 explosives can't remain on the pier
longer than 24 hours.
7. Movement of larger quantities of Class 1.1 through 1.5
explosives through the port will be considered only on
an individual basis. [Ref. 28, Section III]
These regulations are in addition to those specified
or stated in Title 49 of the CFR. They involve quantity
and time restrictions and require no additional equipment.
Exceptions to these regulations require special permission
from the port and are only considered for individual
shipments. [Ref. 18]
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The important point with these regulations is the NEW
restrictions. Depending on the specific ammunition type,
the NEW of the port can be exceeded with just two TEUs of
Class 1.1 explosive. Unless these restrictions are
relaxed, the 1772 TEUs moved during TC95 would require more
than one year and over 800 ships to move through the Port
of Oakland. Due to the large population nearby, Port
Authorities will not easily waive these requirements. This
makes regular ammunition shipments through the Port of
Oakland improbable. [Ref. 18]
E. SUMMARY
This chapter described various regulations controlling
the movement of containerized ammunition through military
ports and the commercial ports of Oakland, CA. , Pusan, ROK,
and Chinhae, ROK. Ammunition movement through Pusan is
prohibited by the SALS-K, while movement through Oakland is
severely limited by the low NEW listed in the Port of
Oakland Tariff. Additional expenses associated with
ammunition movement through commercial ports include pier
and explosive segregation requirements listed in the CFR
and military regulations requiring container inspections
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and guards. Viewed together, the CFR, military regulations
and local commercial port regulations make moving
ammunition through commercial ports more difficult and
expensive than through military ports.
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IV. COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines how the commercial shipboard
movement options used or attempted during the TURBO CADS
(TC) exercises fit with commercial ocean liner business
strategies. This chapter will look at political
sensitivities associated with ammunition transportation
through commercial ports and the decreasing commercial use
of 20-foot shipping containers.
B. TURBO CADS MOVEMENT OPTIONS
Recall the TC discussion in Chapter II. TC94 used two
self-loading and unloading (self-sustaining) ships, one
from the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) , and one chartered.
TC95 attempted and failed to use commercial ocean liner
service through to the commercial port of Pusan. The
ammunition was finally moved with a Military Sealift
Command chartered small containership and an ocean-going
tug and self-sustaining barge chartered from Crowley
Maritime Services, Inc. TC96 was canceled and TC97 used a
53
RRF lighter aboard ship (LASH) vessel modified to allow
stacked containers to be carried in the LASH barges.
In an effort to understand why commercial ocean liner
service failed while charter worked, these modes are
discussed below.
C. COMMERCIAL OCEAN LINER BUSINESS STRATEGIES
Commercial ocean liners offer regularly scheduled
transportation service between ports much the same as
commercial airliners move passengers. Like the airlines,
these companies know that when a ship is not underway
moving containers, it is not making money. Commercial
ocean liners expand this premise and base their business
strategy on maximizing ship usage and volume carried while
maintaining schedules. The time a ship spends in port is
minimized, companies get more business when schedules are
met, and are paid by volumes transported. [Ref 29, 30]
1 . Routing and Scheduling
Efforts to maximize ship usage have changed ship
routing. Ships no longer travel back and forth between two
ports, but travel in a circular route, stopping at many
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different ports along the way much like a city bus route.
An example of this can be seen in how two shipping
companies, Sea-Land and American President Line (APL)
,
route cargo between Oakland, CA. and Pusan or Chinhae, ROK.
These companies are used since they are the two major U.S.
flagged carriers operating between Oakland and the ROK.
The shipping routes are as follows:
Sea-Land: Oakland, CA to Dutch Harbor, Alaska to
Yokohama, JA, to Pusan, ROK to Kwang Yang, ROK
to Kaoshiung, Taiwan to Naha, JA, to Shangai, PRO
to Kwang Yang, ROK to Pusan, ROK to Yokohama, JA,
and back to Oakland, CA.
Note: Ships arrive and depart on the same day.
Sea-Land will offload at Kwang Yang and truck
cargo to Chinhae. Cargo does not change ships.
[Ref. 31]
APL: Manzanilla, Mexico to Los Angeles, CA, to
Oakland, CA, to Kaoshiung, Taiwan to Naha, JA, to
Pusan, ROK to Hakata, JA, to Yokohama, JA, to
Oakland, CA, to Los Angeles, CA, and back to
Manzanilla, Mexico.
Note: Ships arrive and depart on the same day.
APL does not offer service to Chinhae, ROK.
Cargo does not change ships. [Ref. 32]
Stops at each port vary from a couple of hours to a
maximum of one day, with ships leaving port as soon as
possible. The time variance is due to differing amounts of
cargo at each port and the different speeds that ports load
and offload containers. Slack time is built into the
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schedule to buffer unforeseen events such as bad weather or
unusually long port turnaround times. Maintaining the
published schedule is of paramount importance. [Ref. 30,
31, 32]
Sea-Land and APL use ships that carry approximately
3000 TEUs for the routes listed above. There are two
departures per company per week, for a total capacity of
12,000 TEUs weekly. The advertised time between Oakland,
CA and Kwang Yang, ROK is 14 days for Sea-Land, and between
Oakland, CA and Pusan, ROK is 17 days for APL. [Ref. 31,
32]
It is important to note that a commercial ocean liner
carrying containerized ammunition from Oakland, CA to the
ROK would have to comply with ammunition transportation
regulations in every port where it stopped. That is the
primary reason why APL and Sea-Land (and all other eligible
commercial liner companies) refused to bid on the TC95
contract requiring ammunition transportation from Oakland
to either Pusan or Chinhae, ROK. Lack of volume is the
second reason. [Ref 5, 30, 33, 34]
Compare the volume of ammunition shipped during the
Pacific TC's exercises (1387 TEUs in TC94 and 1772 TEUs in
TC95) with the capacity of the ocean liners. Sea-Land has
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the capability of carrying 6000 TEUs per week or 312,000
TEUs yearly from Oakland to the ROK. Dividing the 1772
TEUs shipped during TC95 by the 312,000 yearly capability
shows that that business would be only .6 percent.
Additionally, since both APL and Sea-Land are using 3000
TEU ships, one ship would be able to haul the ammunition
moved in either TC94 or TC95. With this small volume, it
is not surprising that commercial liners refused to modify
their routes to pick-up ammunition at NWWS Concord, CA, or
Port Hadlock, WA. [Ref. 30, 33, 34]
D. COMMERCIAL CHARTER
Commercial charter consists of renting a vessel,
including crew, for transportation. As discussed
previously, this was done in TC94 and TC95. During the
exercises, two types of charter were used.
The first was the chartering of containerships . For
this, Military Sealift Command reguested bids from U.S.
flagged charter service companies. The lowest bid meeting
capacity and date requirements was used. This method
successfully obtained the needed ships. [Ref. 13]
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The second charter used was an ocean-going tug with
self-sustaining barge. This was successfully employed
during TC95 after commercial liner service failed. It had
the advantage of being cheaper (smaller crew and lower fuel
costs) than a containership charter but with an average
speed of 8 knots, it was significantly slower than the 13
knot speed of the average containership. [Ref. 5, 34]




As noted in Chapter III, military regulations require
the use of TEU shipping containers for moving containerized
ammunition. However, current trends in the commercial
shipping industry are moving quickly towards using forty
foot equivalent unit (FEU) containers. This trend and its
implications are discussed below.
2 . Move to Forty-Foot Containers
Beginning in the 1970' s, new containership
construction began changing from those with a predominance
of TEU container slots to FEU slots. Efficiency drove this
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change as TEU containers require twice the handling and
lifts for the same cargo carried in FEU containers.
Currently, in the U.S. flagged fleet, 77 percent of
shipboard container slots are configured for 40-foot
containers. [Ref 35, p.D-4-5] Today, containerships
contain a large percentage of FEU slots with only a handful
of TEU slots. Current containership construction shows
this trend will continue to reduce the slots available for
TEUs. [Ref. 30, 34, 35, p.D-4-5, 6]
3 . Implications
The exclusive use of TEUs for ammunition
transportation limits the military' s options when
considering movement by commercial ocean liner or chartered
vessel. Also, leaving the FEUs open on chartered vessels
decreases efficiency and can affect vessel safety.
Depending on the location of the TEU cells, loading a
vessel with only TEUs can cause trim and stability problems
if the FEUs are not used. [Ref. 34, 35, p.D-4-5]
4 . Possible Solutions
The simplest solution would be to change DoD policy
requiring exclusive use of TEUs for ammunition. This will
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expand vessel selection, and increase efficiency by
allowing use of FEUs . Military ammunition ports are
equipped to handle both TEUs and FEUs. However, ammunition
depots and military bases would be required to upgrade
container handling equipment (CHE) to allow the use of
FEUs. [Ref. 35, p.D-4-5]
Another option would be the use of pontoons along with
the newly developed container Quick-tie. The Quick-tie
links join two 20-foot containers together, allowing them
to use the 40-foot container cells. The pontoon sits under
the lowest container and provides center support to allow
other containers to be stacked on top. Figure 3 shows how
pontoons and Quick-ties would be utilized using 20-foot
containers in 40-foot cells.
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Shipboard Container Slots





Using only Quick ties. Deck not
reinforced at mid-point. Can only
stack one nigi.
Figure 3. Use of Quick-ties and Pontoons
Once the linked containers reached a military port, they
could be unlinked allowing use of 20-foot CHE.
F. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Public perception is an important factor in deciding
how and where ammunition will be moved. This becomes even
more important in a peacetime environment where threats to
national security are low. Current ammunition
transportation practices have significantly lowered the
61
risk of accidental explosions during ammunition
transportation. However, the public must also perceive
that ammunition transportation holds little threat to their
safety.
This section will briefly look at the current
ammunition transportation safety record and show how public
perception can affect ammunition transportation.
1 . Safety Record
On July 17, 1944, 320 people were killed and another
390 wounded in a huge explosion that occurred while loading
ammunition onto two ships at the U.S. Naval Magazine, Port
Chicago, CA (now Naval Weapons Station Concord) . This
explosion had the force of 5,000 tons of dynamite, was felt
as far away as Nevada, destroyed a train, a 1200 foot pier,
sank one ship, and reduced another ship to pieces no larger
than an automobile hood. The cause of the explosion was
never determined. [Ref. 36, 37]
In response to this accident, and to previous
accidents such as a 1926 ammunition explosion at Lake
Denmark, NJ, strict military and federal ammunition
transportation regulations were introduced. Since 1944,
enforcement of these regulations has prevented any major
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accidental explosions while transporting U.S. ammunition.
[Ref. 36, 37]
2 . Perception vs . Reality
In 1972, a haunting photo of a young Vietnamese girl,
running naked down a road after being badly burned in a
napalm raid, was published in U.S. papers. This photo and
the accompanying description of how napalm was used were
permanently etched into public memory. Today, the word
"napalm" still evokes horrible images. [Ref. 38]
In December 1998, the U.S. Navy announced plans to
ship Vietnam-era napalm from storage in CA to Pollution
Control Industries, a commercial recycling plant in
Chicago, IL for conversion into alternative fuel. A
political firestorm ensued. Two U.S. Representatives,
Peter J. Visclosky of Indiana and Rod R. Blagojevich of
Illinois used the public perception and fear of napalm to
cause PCI to back out of their contract with the U.S. Navy.
[Ref. 39, 40]
The public's fear was unfounded. Napalm is not a high
explosive; it's a mixture of gasoline and plastic. In
fact, it reguires a detonator to ignite and according to
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, is safer to
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transport than gasoline. Since the detonators had been
removed, the napalm held less explosive risk than gasoline
delivery trucks. [Ref. 41, 42]
Once PCI backed out of its contract to recycle the
napalm, the U.S. Navy began receiving calls from companies
wanting to take over the job. GNI Group Inc. of Houston,
TX was selected for the job. Houston area residents were
also given information by the U.S. Navy on the public risks
of napalm. Additionally, the Houston Chronicle published a
lengthy question and answer article about the upcoming
napalm recycling. Although there were some local protests
about the napalm shipments, they quickly died down. As of
January ^99, the recycling of Vietnam-era napalm continues
in Houston. TX without protest. [Ref. 40, 41]
DoD should carefully consider public perceptions when
considering ammunition transportation routes and modes.
Public relations programs designed to educate the public on





This chapter reviewed the failure of attempts to use
commercial liner service for moving containerized
ammunition during TURBO CADS exercises. The reasons for
this failure include current ship routing, commercial port
regulations, and the low volume of ammunition to be
shipped. The low volume offered up by the government
doesn't make it worth commercial liners' time to change
ship routing to call on military ammunition ports or deal
with ammunition transportation regulations in commercial
ports
.
DoD must take steps to ensure that the public is
provided accurate information on the risks of moving
ammunition through commercial ports. Without this
information, local politicians and activists may use the
negative perceptions from previous accidents to prevent
ammunition movement through commercial ports.
Using commercial chartered containerships or ocean
going tugs and self-sustaining barges through military
ports have been the only successful commercial methods for
moving containerized ammunition. These methods may also be
jeopardized by the continuing reduction of TEU slots unless
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the military shifts to FEU ammunition transportation
containers or adopts TEU containers for use in FEU slots.
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
Decreasing U.S. military budgets have caused DoD
leaders to search for cost savings by adopting commercial
practices and outsourcing military jobs to commercial
counterparts. The transportation of ammunition is one of
these areas
.
In 1992, USCINCPAC determined that the current
ammunition transportation system relied too much on
breakbulk movement. The following year, USTRANSCOM began
devising and funding the TC exercises, whose purpose was to
develop a containerized ammunition delivery system (CADS)
for DoD.
The TC exercises developed the military's CADS and
partially proved the concept of commercial containerized
ammunition shipments. However, they also showed that
federal, military and local regulations as well as
international agreements have a large impact on where and
how ammunition can travel. Federal regulations strictly
control the conditions and permits required prior to moving
explosive material. Military regulations add NEW limits as
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well as security and inspection requirements to ammunition
shipments. Added to these are local commercial port
regulations that can limit the NEW within the port as well
as the length of time ammunition can remain in port. These
regulations severely restrict ammunition shipments through
commercial ports. Finally, the SALS-K agreement with the
ROK limits ammunition shipments to the military pier at
Chinhae
.
Business practices also affect commercial ammunition
movement. Ocean liners base their business strategy on
using regularly scheduled service to maximize the volume
carried as well as ships' usage. Ammunition loading and
inspection requirements increase port turn-around times,
which increase ships' operating costs. Additionally,
shipping companies will not divert liner service to
military ammunition ports for low volume and infrequent
peacetime ammunition shipping requirements.
Military regulations requiring the use of TEU
containers limit commercial options since 77 percent of
commercial capacity uses FEU containers. Ways to alleviate
this problem include changing the regulation to allow the
use of FEU containers or using equipment that joins two TEU
containers together allowing use of FEU slots.
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It is important that military leaders recognize that
public perception regarding ammunition transportation can
affect movement options. Military leaders must take steps
to educate the public on current ammunition transportation
safety records. Without this information, local activists
may use the negative perceptions from previous accidents to
prevent ammunition movement through their area.
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Conclusion: It is not feasible to move peacetime
ammunition shipments through commercial ports.
This was shown during TC95 and is supported by
regulations and commercial business practices. For
example, without waivers to Oakland's ammunition
transportation regulations, ships could be limited to as
few as two ammunition containers. It would be highly
unlikely for Oakland to grant regular waivers to a
regulation specifically put in place to limit the port's
NEW.




Military ammunition ports have the NEW capacity and
experience to handle large quantities of ammunition.
2. Conclusion: Commercial ocean-going tug with
self-unloading barge is the most effective way to
commercially transport ammunition overseas.
This method was successfully used during TC95. Though
slower than chartered containerships, it is less costly and
more flexible, allowing ammunition movement into ports with
limited CHE.
Recommendation: Use commercial ocean-going tug with
self-unloading barge for peacetime ammunition
shipments .
The TC95 after action report recommended this method
for incorporation into OPLANs
.
3. Conclusion: The TEU container is being phased
out of commercial transportation systems.
Currently 23 percent of slots on containerships are
for TEU containers. Industry trends show TEU container
slots and availability will continue to fall as commercial




Recommendation: DoD needs to review its policy of
using only TEU containers for ammunition
transportation .
There are two ways to go. The first would be to
change the policy and allow FEU containers for ammunition
movement. This has the advantage of reduced container
handling costs and commercial availability, but would
require DoD to spend money to upgrade CHE for FEU
containers. The second option is to use existing
technology to join two TEU containers together to fit in
FEU slots. This would probably be cheaper, but may require
DoD to maintain a fleet of TEU containers if they are
commercially phased out.
4 . Conclusion : Public perceptions on ammunition
transportation safety can stop ammunition
shipments .
This happened when DoD attempted to ship old napalm to
Illinois for recycling. Although the napalm held less
explosive risk than gasoline tank trucks, politicians and
activists fanned negative public perceptions into protests
and stopped the shipments.
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Recommendation: Ensure that the public gets factual
data on ammunition transportation risks.
Once DoD and local newspapers presented the factual
hazards posed by napalm transportation, the shipments were
sent, without protest, to a Houston area plant for
recycling
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1
.
Determine the best way to move ammunition during
a major regional or local regional conflict.
Analyze the best mode for moving the higher quantities
of ammunition required overseas during wartime. The
research would focus on the question of what mode to use
and also on the availability of sufficient commercial
assets for the quantities required.
2 . Determine the cost to upgrade CHE at DoD
ammunition facilities to handle FEU containers.
This research would look at DoD ammunition depots,
ports and transportation units to determine the cost of
upgrading their CHE to handle FEU containers.
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3.
Determine if DoD should change the regulation
requiring TEU containers for ammunition shipment
to allow FEU containers .
This research would look at future forecasts of
commercially available TEU containers. It would answer the
question of whether DoD should continue to use TEU
containers and adapt them to FEU slots or switch to FEU
containers and upgrade CHE.
4 . Determine if the port of Chinhae has enough
capacity to support a Korean MRC.
The SALS-K requires that all ammunition brought
into the ROK go through the military pier at Chinhae. This
research would determine if Chinhae had the container
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